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STANDING TO CHALLENGE GOVERNMENTAL
ACTIONS WHICH HAVE AN INSUBSTANTIAL
OR ATTENUATED EFFECT ON THE
ENVIRONMENT
In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP),1 the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who al-
leged that a certain administrative action had had a deleterious effect
upon their use and enjoyment of the natural environment had standing
to challenge that action in court, notwithstanding the fact that the
causal connection between the administrative action and the harm al-
leged by the plaintiffs was concededly both tenuous and indirect.
SCRAP, an association formed by five law students,2 challenged an
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) order, which maintained the
effectiveness of a 2.5 percent surcharge on national railroad freight
rates,' by contending that the order was invalid since the ICC had
failed to file an environmental impact statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).4  The basis for SCRAP's claim
1. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HIv. L. REv.
645 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Scott].
2. The unincorporated association was formed at the George Washington Univer-
sity National Law Center in order "to enhance the quality of the human environment
for its members, and for all citizens . . . ." 412 U.S. at 678, citing amended com-
plaint in SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972); see Aberdeen
& Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207, 1208 n.1 (1972). See also SCRAP v.
United States, 346 F. Supp. at 191. Also intervening, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 24,
were the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., the National Parks and Conservation
Association, and the Izaak Walton League of America. 412 U.S. at 680 n.9.
3. Substantially all the railroads in the United States had filed with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission for a 2.5 percent surcharge on freight rates, to become
effective in February, 1972. 412 U.S. at 675. The Interstate Commerce Act, § 15,
49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970), provides that the Commission shall have the authority to
suspend such a rate change for a seven month period pending an investigation and
decision on the lawfulness of the new rates. Shippers, competing carriers, and others
requested the Commission to utilize its authority under this provision to suspend the
rates. On February 1, 1972, shortly before the surcharge was to automatically be-
come effective unless suspended, the Commission issued an unpublished order an-
nouncing its decision not to suspend the rate increase. 412 U.S. at 676. An un-
published order of April 24, 1972, permitted an extension of a 2.5 percent temporary
surcharge. Id. at 677.




was a contention that the increased freight rates had adversely affected
the environment by discouraging the transportation of recyclable ma-
terials. This effect, the plaintiffs claimed, had in turn resulted in in-
creased depletion of the area's natural resources through promotion
of the use of new raw materials which compete with scrap and had
added to the accumulation in the environment of otherwise recyclable
materials in the form of refuse and waste.5 To establish standing
SCRAP alleged that its members suffered "recreational and aesthetic
harm" as a result of the Commission's action in that each of them
used the natural environment, both in and around the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area and in the areas of their legal residence, for
recreational and aesthetic purposes.6 In response to this claim, the
government contended that SCRAP was without standing to sue be-
cause it had "no more than a general interest in seeing that the law
is enforced . . . . 7 After rejecting this defense and finding that the
plaintiffs had standing to seek review, a three-judge district court
granted a preliminary injunction against the order permitting the rate
increase.8 On direct appeal, 9 the Supreme Court held that the plain-
tiffs' allegations were sufficient to give them standing to challenge the
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
5. 412 U.S. at 676.
6. Id. at 678. SCRAP also asserted that its members had been injured by in-
creased air pollution as a result of the modified rate structure. Furthermore, SCRAP
alleged that its members had been harmed economically, asserting that lack of recycling
had increased the price of finished products which its members purchased and had in-
creased the taxes which they paid. Id.
7. Id. at 681, quoting SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D.D.C.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
8. 346 F. Supp. at 202. Initially, a single district court judge denied the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Thereafter, a three-judge district court
was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2284, 2325 (1970). 346 F. Supp. at 194 n.7.
The three-judge court held that SCRAP had met the standing requirements set
forth by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). 346 F.
Supp. at 195. The Data Processing and Barlow cases are discussed in notes 20-24
infra and accompanying text. The court also relied on NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963), for the proposition that an organization whose members are injured may
obtain judicial review on behalf of such members.
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ICC action;10 however, it reversed on the merits, concluding that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the ICC rate order.1
Standing is a legal concept which eludes precise definition. 2
The Supreme Court has observed that the concept is designed -to ascer-
tain whether a party has a sufficient stake in the resolution of a par-
ticular controversy to ensure that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated
will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution."' 3  Thus, standing serves to
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides for direct appeals from three-judge federal
district courts to the Supreme Court from any order granting or denying an injunction
in a civil suit.
Following issuance of the injunction by the three-judge court and prior to the ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the intervening
railroads applied to the Chief Justice sitting as Circuit Justice for the District of Co-
lumbia for a stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. Aberdeen & Rock-
fish R.R. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207 (Burger, Circuit Justice, 1972). However, the
Chief Justice, finding that the district court had not abused its discretion in granting
the injunctive relief, refused to issue the stay. Id. at 1217-18.
10. 412 U.S. at 690.
11. The Court concluded that the case before it was controlled by its earlier deci-
sion in Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963). In Arrow, the
Court held that section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970),
placed the power to suspend railroad rates exclusively in the hands of the Commis-
sion, thereby extinguishing the power of the courts to grant such relief. 412 U.S. at
691.
12. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968). Quoting a statement by Pro-
fessor Paul A. Freund before a Senate subcommittee, the Flast Court described the law
of standing as "one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of the public
law." Id. at 99, citing Hearings on S. 1097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (1966). See also
Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Schaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Standing has
also been characterized as a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction." United
States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). Professor Davis has en-
dorsed this description and has further stated his view that this "'complicated spe-
cialty . . .' keeps on producing a large volume of wasteful litigation that in turn keeps
on adding to the complexity." K. DAvis § 22.00-4, at 722 (Supp. 1970) (footnote
omitted). See also Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inade-
quate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 497 (1974) (concept of stand-
ing is "opaque"). Professor Scott has observed that "these decisions [the standing cases
decided in the Supreme Court since 1968] have failed to establish a coherent and unified
doctrine of standing that explains their results." Scott 660.
The requirements of the law of standing are particularly pertinent to challenges
of administrative actions generally. See C. WRiGHT, LAW OF FEDRmuL CounTs 39
(2d ed. 1970). "The law of standing is almost exclusively concerned with such public
law questions as determinations of constitutionality and review of administrative or
other governmental action." Id. (emphasis added).
13. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). See also Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972), where the Court observed that the question of standing was an
inquiry by a court into "[wihether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justici-




assure the "concrete adverseness" necessary not only to allow proper judi-
cial consideration of disputed issues' 4 but also to comply with the case
and controversy requirements of article 1H.1Y Unlike other doctrines
developed to assist the courts in adjudicating disputes, the standing in-
quiry is concerned with the threshold determination of the relationship
between the particular plaintiff and the issues he desires to litigate, rather
than the merits of the question 6 or the appropriateness of the issue
itself for judicial determination.' 7
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act 8 (APA) pro-
vides judicial review to any party "adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute . . .,19
Construing this language in the companion cases of Association of
14. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), where the Court observed
that standing functioned "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the pre-
sentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
• . . questions."
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the
exercise of judicial power is limited to cases and controversies. See Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), where the Court observed: "Mhe exercise of the judicial
power is limited to 'cases' and 'controversies.' Beyond this it does not extend, and
unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution,
the power to exercise it is nowhere conferred." Id. at 356. The question of standing,
is related to the article M limitations on the exercise of judicial power. See Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (taxpayer has standing to challenge legality of fed-
eral spending program). In Data Processing, the Court stated that "the question of
standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the framework of Article I which
restricts judicial power to 'cases and controversies.'" 397 U.S. at 151. See also
O'Shea v. Littleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139, 4141 n.2 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116, 121 (10th Cir. 1973). But see
Scott 673, where the author states "it is highly questionable that [the] standing doc-
trine has anything in turn to contribute to the implementation of the case or contro-
versy requirement." For a contention that there is no historical basis for the concept
of case and controversy as interpreted by the federal courts and that the Constitution
does not demand an injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to the attainment
of standing, see Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Re-
quirement?, 78 YALE L.J 816, 840 (1969).
16. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 171 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). See note 23 infra.
17. For example, the issues of mootness, collusiveness, political question, ripeness,
and reviewability are clearly distinguishable from the issue of standing in that standing,
unlike these other concepts, focuses on the sufficiency of the claimant's interest in the
case. See Scott 684. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 171 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), where Mr. Justice Brennan, citing Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968), stated that the question of standing is neither
a part of the above doctrines nor concerned with the merits of the case. 397 U.S.
at 171 n.3. For a discussion of Barlow, see note 23 infra.
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970).
19. Id. § 702.
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Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp"0 and Barlow
v. Collins,21 the Supreme Court held that persons have standing to
obtain judicial review of administrative action when they allege (1)
injury in fact, as a result of the challenged action, and (2) injury
to an interest which is arguably within the zone of interests protected
by the statutory provisions allegedly violated.22 Although the injuries
asserted in both these cases were economic in nature,2 8 the Court in-
20. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
21. Id. at 159.
22. Id. at 153. The Court rejected the contention that in order to acquire
standing a plaintiff must allege and demonstrate the violation of some "legal interest."
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, observed: "The 'legal interest' test goes
to the merits. The question of standing is different." Id. The "legal interest" test
had been most clearly articulated in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118
(1939), where the Court observed that a plaintiff would have standing only where his
right that had allegedly been invaded was "a legal right,-one of property, one arising
out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
.... " Id. at 137. Under this test, it is clear that an inquiry into a plaintiff's stand-
ing necessarily embraces a determination of the merits of his cause of action. See
also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); The Chicago Junction Case,
264 U.S. 258 (1924); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S.
143 (1923); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 447 (1887).
Justice Brennan concurred in the granting of standing in Data Processing and
Barlow, but dissented from the Court's announcement of its bifurcated test of standing.
397 U.S. at 167. In criticizing the majority's test, Justice Brennan observed:
My view is that the inquiry in the Court's first step [allegation of injury in
fact] is the only one that need be made to determine standing. I had thought
we discarded the notion of any additional requirement when we discussed
standing solely in terms of its constitutional content in Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968). By requiring a second, nonconstitutional step, the Court
comes very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement that conditioned
standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the challenged governmental ac-
tion invaded one of his legally protected interests. Id. at 168.
23. In Data Processing, the plaintiff, who sold data processing services to busi-
nesses, challenged a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national banks
to make these same services available to its banking customers. 397 U.S. at 151.
The Court held that allegations by the plaintiff that the ruling had caused it to
lose profits and former customers to banks were sufficient to constitute injury in fact.
Id. at 152. Furthermore, the Court held that the competitive harm which the plaintiff
was suffering was arguably within the zone of interests of section 4 of the Bank Serv-
ice Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970), which provides: "No bank service cor-
poration may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for
banks." The Court concluded that since both parts of the standing test had been met,
the plaintiff had standing to challenge the ruling. 397 U.S. at 158.
In Barlow, a group of tenant farmers challenged a regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture which relaxed restrictions on the contractual assignments of
crop support payments made pursuant to section 402 of the Food and Agriculture Act
of 1965, 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (1970). The farmers alleged that the regulation would
facilitate the landlords' practice of requiring tenants to assign support payments as a
precondition to obtaining a lease to work the land. This, the tenant farmers urged,
would leave them without the necessary cash to purchase their supplies and make them
dependent on the landlords for credit at exorbitant rates and, therefore, would make it
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dicated in dicta in Data Processing that noneconomic injuries could
also satisfy the injury in fact requirement.24
In Sierra Club v. Morton,25 the Court applied the standing test
articulated in Data Processing to a plaintiff seeking to challenge ad-
ministrative action which, the plaintiff alleged, would adversely affect
the environment. The plaintiff, an environmental organization,"0
sought to enjoin the granting of permits by the Secretary of the Interior
which allowed, inter alia, construction of a road and power line into
Mineral King Valley and Sequoia National Park in connection with
the development of a recreational resort. 7  The plaintiff brought suit
as an organization with a "special interest in the conservation and the
sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests
of the country," 28 asserting that it was a party "adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action" within the meaning of section 10(a) of the
APA.-0  In order to ascertain whether the first branch of the bifurcated
Data Processing test had been satisfied, the Court examined the plain-
tiff's allegations that the proposed development "would destroy or oth-
erwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and
wildlife of the park . .. for future generations."' 0 Significantly, the
Court explicitly confirmed what it had indicated in Data Processing-
that aesthetic and environmental injuries are sufficient to constitute
injury in fact.31  Moreover, it noted that "the fact that particu-
impossible for them to earn a profit. The Court held that the plaintiffs' allegations of
economic hardship constituted injury in fact and thereby assured the personal stake
required by the article M, section 2 case and controversy requirements. The Court
also found that the tenant farmers' interests were within the zone of interests of
section 402 of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 which provides: "The Secretary
shall provide adequate safeguards to protect the interests of tenants.. .. " 7 U.S.C. §
1444(d)(10) (1970). 397 U.S. at 164, 167.
24. The Data Processing Court discussed various noneconomic values including
aesthetic, conservational, and recreational values, and even a spiritual stake in first
amendment values and concluded: "We mention these noneconomic values to empha-
size that standing may stem from them as well as from the economic injury on which
petitioners rely here." 397 U.S. at 154.
25. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
26. Id. at 735 n.8. The Sierra Club alleged in its complaint that it was a non-
profit corporation, organized and operating under the laws of California, with its prin-
cipal place of business in San Francisco. Furthermore, the Club alleged that its princi-
pal purpose was to protect and preserve the natural resources of the Sierra Nevada
Mountains and that it served as the responsible representative of those interested in
these resources. The Sierra Club had 27,000 members in the Bay Area and 78,000
members nationally. Id.
27. Id. at 730 n.2.
28. Id. at 735 n.8.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
30. 405 U.S. at 734.
31. Id. At least one commentator has suggested that the primary importance
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lar environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the
few does not make them less deserving of legal protection .... "132
However, the Court reasoned that a cognizable injury by itself is insuf-
ficient to comply with the requirement of injury in fact. Rather, that
test requires that the particular party seeking review be among the
injured.3 Consequently, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had
not met the injury in fact requirement since it had not alleged that
either the Club itself or its members actually used the area which was
threatened by the projected development.3 4 After noting that the
Club had failed to state "that its members use Mineral King for any
purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would be signifi-
cantly affected by the proposed actions of the respondents,"35 the
Court rejected the Club's argument that it could establish the requisite
injury in fact by alleging harm to the public interest, which it claimed
to represent. In so doing, the Court observed that the public interest
could be asserted only after the litigant itself had established stand-
ing in its own right. 6 Having found that the injury in fact portion
of Sierra Club lies in its "affirmation, if not holding, that harm of a noneconomic
nature to an individual may constitute injury in fact for standing purposes." Scott 667.
The Court observed that it did "not question that this type of harm [aesthetic and
environmental] may amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing
under § 10 of the APA [5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970)]." 405 U.S. at 734.
In addition to the dicta in Data Processing, see note 24 supra and accompanying
text, other courts have suggested that aesthetic or noneconomic injury could constitute
injury in fact. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), where the grant of a license to set up
a hydroelectric plant at Storm King Mountain was challenged under section 313(b)
of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a), 825(b) (1970). The court suggested
that those who exhibited a special interest in the recreational, aesthetic, or conserva-
tional aspects of power development would be aggrieved under the statute. 354 F.2d
at 616. However, the court limited the value of this statement as persuasive precedent
by subsequently observing that some of the plaintiffs had suffered economic injury even
though, in the court's opinion, it was not required to establish standing. See also En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1953); Crowther v. Seaborg,
312 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (D. Colo. 1970).
32. 405 U.S. at 734.
33. Id. at 735. The Court further stated that an organization whose members are
injured may seek judicial review as a representative of such members. Id. at 739, cit-
ing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
34. 405 U.S. at 735.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 737. In Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942), plain-
tiff Scripps-Howard challenged a grant by the FCC of a broadcast license to another
radio station, alleging that the agency could not lawfully grant the license without a
hearing, that in doing so the FCC had departed from its own rules, that the grant
did not serve the public interest since it had the effect of depriving local listeners of
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of the test had not been satisfied, the Court did not consider whether
the plaintiff met the zone of interests branch of the Data Processing
dual standing requirement3 7
Despite the result reached in Sierra Club,88 the Court made clear
non-network service, and that the Commission thus violated the due process clause of
the fifth amendment Id. at 5. In challenging the grant the plaintiffs acted in ac-
cordance with the judicial review provision of the Communications Act of 1934, § 402
(b)(2), ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1093, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970). See 316
U.S. at 14. The Court observed that the purpose of the Act was to protect the public
interest in communications and continued: "Mhese private litigants have standing
only as representatives of the public interest." Id. See also FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1940) (suggesting that the congressional purpose
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was to protect the public interest and that
economic harm need not be shown by a plaintiff to challenge the grant of a license
to another station).
In Sierra Club, the Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to rely on Scripps-Howard
and Sanders as support for the proposition that one could obtain standing to challenge
administrative action solely as a responsible representative of the public interest:
Taken together, Sanders and Scripps-Howard thus established a dual
proposition: the fact of economic injury is what gives a person standing to
seek judicial review under the statute, but once review is properly invoked,
that person may argue the public interest in support of his claim that the
agency has failed to comply with its statutory mandate. 405 U.S. at 737.
But see Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
The Court then noted: "The test of injury in fact goes only to the question of
standing to obtain judicial review. Once this standing is established, the party may
assert the interests of the general public in support of his claims for equitable relief."
405 U.S. at 740 n.15.
37. 405 U.S. at 733 n.5.
38. Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's holding in Sierra Club, observing:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put
neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental is-
sues to be litigated before . . . federal courts in the name of the inanimate
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded. .. and where injury is the
subject of public outrage. Id. at 741.
Justice Douglas analogized the bringing of an action in the name of the despoiled en-
vironmental resource to a salvage action in admiralty law brought in the name of the
rescuing vessel. Id. at 742 n.2.
Mr. Justice Blackmun also dissented in Sierra Club, criticizing the inflexibility of
standing concepts in the face of the special needs of environmental protection. Id.
at 755. He proposed that an environmental organization with "pertinent, bona fide,
and well-recognized attributes and purposes" be allowed to litigate environmental issues.
Id. at 757. Justice Blackmun expressed the fear that actual users of the park might
have an economic motivation to favor its development and would thus be an unlikely
adversary to challenge the alleged environmental injury. Id. at 759. His fear was that
strict standing requirements in the environmental area would discourage serious opposi-
tion by groups protecting the environment. Id. at 756.
The Court's denial of standing has been criticized by various commentators. Pro-
fessor Scott has objected to the line drawn in the decision between past and potential
future users and those persons who might appreciate Mineral King Valley pictorially
or symbolically. Scott 692. See also Note, Standing to Sue in Federal Courts to Pre-
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that aesthetic and other noneconomic injuries could constitute injury
in fact 3 9 Moreover, if the litigant itself has been injured by the
challenged agency action, it was deemed irrelevant by the Sierra Club
Court that its injuries were shared by a larger segment of the public. 40
In contrast to the plaintiff in Sierra Club, the environmental or-
ganizations challenging the validity of the ICC orders in SCRAP specifi-
cally alleged that the orders would adversely affect its members' use
of the natural resources. 41  As noted above, the plaintiffs' main con-
tention was that the Commission's orders were illegal because they
had been issued without compliance with the impact statement re-
quirements of NEPA.41 Examining the question of whether the plain-
tiffs had standing to obtain judicial review of the challenged order,
the Supreme Court initially noted that the plaintiffs clearly met the
zone of interests test since the environmental interest asserted was un-
doubtedly within the interests to be protected by NEPA. 48  Turning
to the injury in fact requirement, the Court distinguished Sierra Club
on the grounds that in that case the organization had merely claimed
to be a representative of the public interest because of its long-standing
interest in environmental protection and had failed to allege that it
or its members would be adversely affected in their activities by the
agency action complained of.4 Referring to its -dicta in Sierra Club,45
the Court reaffirmed the proposition that noneconomic injuries are suf-
ficient to constitute injury in fact. 0 Moreover, the Court rejected the
argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing since the alleged effect
of the national freight increase was no different upon the Washington
area than upon the rest of the nation. 47 The Court reasoned that "[t]o
vent Governmentally Sponsored Insults to the Environment: The Aftermath of Sierra
Club v. Morton, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 669, 685 (1972); 11 DuQuEsNE L. REv. 165,
182 (1972); 38 Mo. L. Rav. 292, 297 (1973).
39. Several lower federal court cases have applied the holding in Sierra Club that
injuries to noneconomic or aesthetic interests may constitute injury in fact. See, e.g.,
Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972), application for
stay denied, 94 S. Ct. 535 (1973) (construction of dam would injure the recreational
use of the Little Tennessee River); Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., 354 F. Supp. 1099
(N.D. Cal. 1972) (improper construction of dikes threatened the use of the San Fran-
cisco Bay for fishing, sailing, and enjoyment of its scenic beauty); Sierra Club v.
Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972) (dredging project harmed use of the New
Haven harbor for recreational purposes).
40. 405 U.S. at 734.
41. 412 U.S. at 687.
42. See note 4 supra and accompanying text
43. 412 U.S. at 686 n.13. See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
44. Id. at 687. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
46. 412 U.S. at 686.
47. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
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deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many
others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and wide-
spread Government actions could be questioned by nobody."48 Fur-
thermore, the Court refused to accept the government's argument, ap-
parently based upon the Court's language in Sierra Club, that standing
should be confined to those persons who have been significantly af-
fected by agency action. Rather, the Court stated that the injury in
fact requirement functioned "to distinguish a person with a direct stake
in the outcome of a litigation--even though small-from a person with
a mere interest in the problem. '49
Finally, the Court considered the government's contention that
the plaintiffs' allegations that the general freight increase would ad-
versely affect the environment were merely "a ploy to avoid the need
to show some injury in fact.""0 The Court conceded that the environ-
mental injury asserted in SCRAP was "far less direct and perceptible"
than that in Sierra Club and observed an "attenuated line of causation!'
between the agency action and injury complained of.' 1 Although the
Court stated that "pleadings must 'be something more than an ingeni-
Unlike the specific and geographically limited federal action of which the pe-
titioner complained in Sierra Club, the challenged agency action in this case
is applicable to substantially all of the Nation's railroads, and thus allegedly
has an adverse environmental impact on all the natural resources of the coun-
try. Rather than a limited group of persons who used a picturesque valley
in California, all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and
indeed all who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by
the environmental groups here. But we have already made it clear that stand-
ing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury.
Id. at 687, citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093,
1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 631-32 (2d Cir.
1953).
48. 412 U.S. at 688.
49. Id. at 689 n.14. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. See also Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601, 613 (1968), where the author
states that "[flederal law is clear that standing may rest upon a trifle, and it is equally
clear that at least a trifling interest of the plaintiff is always required."
50. 412 U.S. at 688. The railroads, which had intervened as defendants, argued that
SCRAP would never be able to demonstrate that a general rate increase would have
the adverse environmental impact alleged. Id. (For a discussion of plaintiffs' allega-
tions, see notes 5, 6 supra and accompanying text.) The Court stated that it was not
certain that such allegations were not capable of proof. Moreover, the Court observed
that if the "allegations were in fact untrue, then the appellants should have moved for
summary judgment on the standing issue and demonstrated to the District Court that
the allegations were sham and raised no genuine issue of fact." Id. at 689.
51. 412 U.S. at 688. The Court observed that the plaintiffs had asked it
to follow a far more attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury of
which the appellees complained-a general rate increase would allegedly cause
increased use of nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods,
thus resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such
goods, some of which resources might be taken from the Washington area,
and resulting in more -refuse that might be discarded in national parks in the
Washington area [because of less recycling]. Id.
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ous exercise in the conceivable,"52 it did not find the plaintiffs' allega-
tions so specious as to be incapable of proof at trial, and therefore
concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to obtain review.58 How-
ever, on the merits, the Court found that the district court lacked juris-
diction to enjoin the ICC orders. 4
Dissenting on the issue of standing, Justice White, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, argued that the plaintiffs'
injuries were too "remote, speculative and insubstantial" to constitute
injury in fact.55  Rather, he considered -the allegations in SCRAP com-
52. Id. However, in applying the standing requirements of Data Processing and
Sierra Club, some lower federal courts have indicated that they view the allegation of
injury in fact as merely a technical pleading requirement. In Citizens for Clean Air,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a district court discussed
the propriety of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing:
Rather than engage in this technical pirouette, we believe the sounder course
is to deny the motion to dismiss for lack of standing on the condition that
plaintiffs amend the complaint within 20 days to make the pleadings of stand-
mg explicit rather than implicit. Id. at 705.
In a much more direct fashion, the court in National Ass'n for Community Dev.
v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973), characterized the holding in Sierra
Club as "really of a rather limited, technical nature-a matter of pleadings." Id. at
1405. In dealing with the standing question before it, the court expressly relied on
the note in Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8, where the Court had expressly left open
the possibility that the plaintiff might obtain standing by merely amending its com-
plaint to properly allege injury in fact. See also Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp.
419, 424 (D. Conn. 1972) (injury in fact would be found by court where it could
be reasonably inferred from facts alleged).
One commentator has concluded that as a result of Data Processing and Sierra
Club, proper pleading by a prospective plaintiff has become a central issue in standing
cases:
It would present no great difficulty for the Sierra Club to allege that it rep-
resents its members rather than the public, and to find among its members
users of Mineral King who would regard it as despoiled by the development.
And now forewarned, other "public interest" organizations will plead in the
proper form. . . . Scott 667.
53. 412 U.S. at 690. Writing for the concurrence, in which he was joined by Jus-
tice Brennan, Justice Blackmun reaffirmed the views he expressed in his dissenting
opinion in Sierra Club, see note 38 supra, that "responsible and sincere" environmental
organizations should have standing to assert injuries to the environment. 412 U.S. at
699.
54. See note 11 supra.
Justice Douglas, who had concurred with the majority's holding on the standing
question, dissented from the opinion on the merits. In his opinion, Justice Douglas
set forth the impact which recycling has upon the environment, 412 U.S. at 700, and
noted the extent to which the railroad freight rate structure affects the use of the re-
cycling process, id. at 704-05. He contended that the majority's reliance upon Arrow
Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963) (see note 11 supra), was misplaced
inasmuch as Arrow precluded judicial relief only where the ICC has not yet acted.
412 U.S. at 711. However, Justice Douglas argued that the order in SCRAP had the
same effect as an order which sets rates, and therefore should be subject to judicial
review. Id. at 712.
55. 412 U.S. at 723. Justice White also observed that
Vol. 0974:,491!
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
parable to "the general interest allegations found insufficient and too
remote in Sierra Club."56  The dissent clearly reflected a concern
that the finding of standing in SCRAP contravened the case and con-
troversy requirements of article 1]1.17 Justice White suggested that
the majority's opinion, in essence, conferred upon any citizen who dis-
agrees with governmental action the right to challenge that action in
court.
58
After SCRAP it would seem apparent that the bifurcated test of
standing announced in Data Processing poses no substantial obstacle
to those seeking judicial review of administrative actions which alleg-
edly have a pernicious impact upon the environment. First, as the
Court in SCRAP implicitly recognized, environmental statutes such as
NEPA are sufficiently broad as to include practically any asserted en-
vironmental interest within the zone of interests protected by such stat-
utes.59 Consequently, a plaintiff bringing suit to challenge agency ac-
[tihe majority acknowledges that these allegations reflect an "attenuated line
of causation," but is willing to suspend its judgment in the dim hope that
proof at trial will in some unexplained way flesh them out and establish the
necessary nexus between these appellees and the across-the-board rate increase
they complain of. Id. at 722-23 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 723.
57. '"he allegations here do not satisfy the threshold requirement of injury in fact
for constituting a... case or controversy." Id. at 722.
58. Justice White alluded to this problem when he observed: "If [the allegations]
are sufficient here, we are well on our way to permitting citizens at large to litigate
any decisions of the Government which fall in an area of interest to them and with
which they disagree." Id. at 723.
59. In view of the broad purposes of NEPA, it would appear difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a plaintiff asserting an environmental cause of action to fail the zone of inter-
ests branch of the test where a violation of the statute is alleged. This is demonstrated
by the fact that section 2 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970), states that:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the envi-
ronment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man ....
See also section 101(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Supp. 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.
(1970).
For examples of recent environmental cases where the interests of plaintiffs alleg-
edly injured by illegal activities were found to be within the zone of interests of NEPA,
see Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1171 (6th Cir. 1972),
application for stay denied, 94 S. Ct. 535 (1973) (plaintiffs' recreational and eco-
nomic interests in river which were threatened by development held to be within
NEPA); Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1064 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (pollution of air and water used by plaintiffs found to be within zone of
interests of NEPA); Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419, 422 n.1 (D. Conn.
1972) (threat to recreational and aesthetic uses of harbor by dredging held within
zone of interests of NEPA). See also Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29, 36 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974) (nonenviron-
mental case where district court held that zone of interests test would be satisfied by
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fion which allegedly violates such a statute should encounter little diffi-
culty in meeting the zone of interests test.
Similarly, the SCRAP Court's unwillingness to require that a
plaintiff be significantly affected by agency action, together with its
refusal to closely scrutinize a concededly attenuated causal connection
between the asserted injury and the challenged action, suggest that
a prospective environmental plaintiff will find little difficulty complying
with the requirement of injury in fact. Thus, it appears that the Court
in effect has adopted a private attorney general concept in environ-
mental cases.6 To be sure, an environmental plaintiff must allege
that the contested administrative action affects him in some manner.61
"any interest a statute may contemplate," economic or otherwise).
At least three commentators have observed that the zone of interests test is par-
ticularly easy to satisfy, both generally and in environmental suits. Professor Scott
suggests that "relatively weak" indicia of protective intent may suffice. Scott 665. See
also Sedler, Standing, Justiciability and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND.
L. REv. 479, 489 (1972) (zone of interests test no longer has any independent signifi-
cance); Has], Standing Revisited-The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis LJ.
12, 37 (1973) (zone of interests test easy to meet in environmental actions).
60. The private attorney general concept was introduced in Associated Indus.
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). The court
in Ickes suggested that Congress could constitutionally enact a statute conferring on
any non-official person the authority to bring suit to prevent the violation of an offi-
cial's statutory powers. The court reasoned that there would be a controversy even
if the plaintiff's sole purpose was to vindicate the public interest. 134 F.2d at 704
(emphasis added). See also Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d
97, 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally
Jaffe, The Citizen as a Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1033 (1968).
In his dissent in Sierra Club and concurrence in SCRAP, Justice Blackmun articu-
lated a similar, although demonstrably narrower, position by advocating a relaxation
of traditional standing requirements in environmental suits, allowing an organization
with a sincere, dedicated, and established status in environmental matters to assert in-
juries to the environment without any further showing that its own interests have been
affected. 405 U.S. at 757-58, 412 U.S. at 699. See notes 38, 53 supra.
However, the standards by which a court would determine whether an organization
has a provable, sincere, dedicated, and established status in the environment might be
difficult to articulate, and even more difficult for a court to apply.
Other commentators have expressed support for a great relaxation of traditional
standing requirements in environmental actions. See Note, supra note 38, at 676-77;
39 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 492, 503 (1972); 38 Mo. L. REv. 292 (1973). However, Pro-
fessor Davis has observed that "[e]ven though the law of standing is so cluttered and
confused that almost every proposition has some exception, the federal courts have con-
sistently adhered to one major proposition, without exception: One who has no interest
of his own at stake lacks standing." 3 K. DAvis § 22.09-6, at 753 (Supp. 1970).
61. The degree of attenuation between the challenged action and harm alleged
which the courts will allow in finding the injury in fact test satisfied must await further
judicial pronouncements. It is clear, however, that there must be some allegation of
injury in fact by a prospective plaintiff who attempts to invoke judicial review of gov-
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However, SCRAP clearly suggests that the injury may be insubstantial
or indirect and yet constitute injury in fact.62
The liberal view of standing reflected by the SCRAP opinion lim-
its the usefulness of standing as a concept for restricting access to the
judicial process to -those plaintiffs with a personal stake in the matter
to be litigated.6 3  Standing has traditionally functioned to assure the
adverseness necessary to comply with the case and controversy re-
quirements of article II.64 A liberal interpretation of the standing re-
quirement serves to promote greater availability of judicial scrutiny of
administrative action which may adversely affect the environment;"6
however, allowing plaintiffs with remote or insubstantial injuries to ob-
tain that review potentially converts the courts to forums for the vin-
dication of individual value preferences rather than for the resolution
of concrete legal disputes.6 Such a development would not only dras-
ernmental actions. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116
(10th Cir. 1973), the plaintiff environmental organization and several individuals peti-
tioned the circuit court for review of the EPA's approval of clean air implementation
plans of several states pursuant to a provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, which provides:
A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or prom-
ulgating any implementation plan under [the Act] . . . may be filed only in
the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
The court observed that the organizational plaintiff had failed to allege its purposes,
who its members were, and any harm suffered by them as a result of the approval
of the plans. 481 F.2d at 117-18. Furthermore, none of the individual plaintiffs had
alleged they were citizens, residents, voters, or taxpayers of any of the three affected
states, or that they would be affected or aggrieved by the approval. Id. at 118. Ob-
serving that even though the statutory review provisions contained no requirement that
a petitioner be adversely affected or aggrieved, as does section 10(a) of the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1970), the court stated: "We believe that Art. M is controlling and
that petitioners lack standing because they fail to state any injury in fact and hence
do not present a case or controversy within the constitutional mandate." 481 F.2d
at 121.
62. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
65. For an expression of judicial horror at the possibly disruptive effects that un-
limited access to federal courts could have on agency and governmental activities, see
Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 908 (1971), where the court rejected the protection of the public interest as con-
ferring standing: "Were it otherwise the various clubs, political, economic and social
now or yet to be organized, could wreak havoc with the administration of government,
both federal and state." Id. at 1090.
66. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that
limiting standing to those plaintiffs who have been individually harmed by administra-
tive action
serve[s] as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review
will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.
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tically alter the traditional concept of the judicial function but also ar-
guably contravene the constitutional requirements that federal judicial
determinations be made only in the context of a case or controversy.
That goal would be undermined were we to construe the APA to authorizejudicial review at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do
no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial proc-
ess. Id. at 740.
Furthermore, the Court observed that "judicial review is effective largely because it
is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction but is exercised only to rem-
edy a particular, concrete injury." Id. at 740 n.16. It may be argued that the ex-
tremely liberal interpretation of the injury in fact concept revealed in SCRAP creates
the substantial possibility that plaintiffs who have actually suffered no concrete injury
nevertheless may obtain judicial review. Thus, practical elimination of standing as an
effective threshold device for determining whether a particular plaintiff is the proper
party to seek judicial relief may lead to the very result which the Court condemned
in Sierra Club.
